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“I suffer in an unknown manner that is hieroglyphical”:  Jung and Babette en route to 
Freud and Schreber 
Angela Woods 
 
To begin: two fragments.  
The first is an embroidered jacket. It belonged to a woman called Agnes Richter who 
lived in an Austrian asylum in the late 1890s. In the words of artist Renée Turner, the jacket 
is “embroidered so intensively that reading is impossible in certain areas of the garment. 
Words appear and disappear into seams and under layers of thread. There is no beginning or 
end, just spirals of intersecting fragmentary narratives. She is declarative: ‘I,’ ‘mine,’ ‘my 
jacket,’ ‘my white stockings….’, ‘I am in the Hubert-us-burg / ground floor,’ ‘children,’ 
‘sister’ and ‘cook.’ In the inside she has written ‘1894 I am / I today woman.’” Re-
embroidering the laundry number printed on her jacket, “something institutional and distant” 
is transformed “into something intimate, obsessive and possessive.” She transcribes herself. 
This is “hypertext”; this is “untamed writing.”1  
The second fragment, from the first years of the twentieth century, is the transcript of 
an oral interview with another seamstress, Babette S.: “I am the finest professorship”: “This 
is again the highest activity–double– twenty-five francs–I am double polytechnic 
irretrievable–professorship includes in itself the fine learned world–the finest world of art–I 
am also these titles–snail museum clothing, am I, that emanates from me–to cut no thread, to 
choose the best samples, those representing much, and consuming little cloth–I created that 
                                                          
1
Renée Turner, Fudge the Facts (blog), “Writing on a String* //notes for an 
exhibition//,” March 22, 2008, http://www.fudgethefacts.com/?p=10. 
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that concerns me–the fine art world is, to apply the trimming where it can best be seen– plum 
cake on an Indian meal layer. ”2 
*** 
The politics of the fragment, the fragment which undoes the system of representation, 
which, like the unconscious, does not stand for anything, is central to Gilles Deleuze and 
Félix Guattari’s turn to a third “mad text,” Daniel Paul Schreber’s Memoirs of My Nervous 
Illness.
3
  Their book, Anti-Oedipus, celebrates Schreber an exemplary “schizo”–an 
embodiment of the deterritorializing process of schizophrenia, a universal producer, atheist, 
nomad and orphan; a fragmentary figure par excellence.
4
 Among the many scholars and 
devotees of Schreber’s Memoirs, Deleuze and Guattari alone resist its hermeneutic lures by 
refusing to yield to the temptations of interpretation and explanation. As schizoanalysts they 
acknowledge what “Judge Schreber would not deny,” namely, that before “being crushed in 
the psychiatric and psychoanalytic treadmill,” before being reduced to Oedipus, “all delirium 
possesses a world-historical, political, and racial content, mixing and sweeping along races, 
cultures, continents, and kingdoms.”5 Forget the confines of the nursery or the Greek 
amphitheater; the schizo is connected to the world.  
*** 
In 1893, soon after his appointment to the high office of Senatspräsident (President of 
the Court of Appeal) in Dresden, Daniel Paul Schreber is admitted to the University Clinic of 
Leipzig with psychotic symptoms. He is subsequently transferred to the Sonnenstein Asylum 
                                                          
2
Carl Jung, The Psychology of Dementia Praecox, trans. A. A. Brill (1944), 106.  
3
Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus: Capitalism and Schizophrenia, 
trans. Robert Hurley, Mark Seem, and Helen R. Lane (1982). 
4
Mark Seem, introduction to Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, xxi.  
5
Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-Oedipus, 274, 88; see also 352, 62, 65.  
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in Pirna. Eight years later, Schreber launches a legal appeal to have his tutelage rescinded, his 
rights restored. Memoirs of My Nervous Illness is a key document in this appeal and is 
published shortly after Schreber’s discharge from the Sonnenstein in 1903. Carl Jung sends 
the Memoirs to Sigmund Freud, who in 1911 publishes his analysis of Schreber as “Psycho-
Analytical Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia (Dementia 
Paranoides).”6 According to Freud, psychotic patients openly display the secrets of the 
unconscious, so “it follows that this is precisely a disorder in which a written report or a 
printed case history can take the place of personal acquaintance with the patient.”7 And yet in 
Freud’s writing, the feeling of intimacy, of a bond between men, is unmistakable. So strong is 
Freud’s identification with Schreber that Freud used his neologisms to develop a private 
discourse with Jung, refers to him as “the wonderful Schreber, who ought to have been made 
a professor of psychiatry and director of a mental hospital,” and even comes to understand 
many of his own relationships through Schreber’s paranoia.8 Thanks to Freud, Schreber goes 
                                                          
6
Sigmund Freud, “Psycho-Analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case 
of Paranoia (Dementia Paranoides),” in TheEdition of the Complete Psychological Works of 
Sigmund Freud, ed. James Strachey (1960), 11:1-82.  
7
Ibid., 9.  
8
William McGuire, ed., The Freud/Jung Letters: The Correspondence Between 
Sigmund Freud and C. G. Jung, trans. Ralph Manheim and R. F. C. Hull (1974), 311; see 
also John Farrell, Freud’s Paranoid Quest: Psychoanalysis and Modern Suspicion (1996), 
188-94.  
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on to become “the most famous madman in the history of psychiatry,” his Memoirs “a 
scripture leading to a multifarious exegetical literature that is still growing.”9  
*** 
2011.  I am at a conference marking the centenary of Daniel Paul Schreber’s death. 
Writers, readers and devotees of that exegetical literature have gathered to investigate the 
world-historical significance of Schreber’s delirium.10 Moshe Zuckermann asks: What do we 
want from Schreber? Do we really need to “rescue” Schreber from Freud, or from anyone 
else? Or do we use him for our own ends? What if Schreber is “just” a writer? Our 
discussions take place in a recently refurbished building on the site of the Sonnenstein 
asylum. Three floors below our meeting room is a memorial honoring the 13,720 people 
killed in 1940 and 1941 by the National Socialist “Action T4” program. The victims of 
Action T4 were judged to be mentally ill or retarded, and unfit for work. Were seamstresses 
and former judges spared? We visit what remains of the gas chamber and crematorium.  
*** 
German psychiatry, by the end of the nineteenth century, had become almost 
exclusively focused on the somatic etiology of psychiatric disease. The microscope was the 
privileged tool of the alienist’s trade, and the goal of biological analysis was to identify 
                                                          
9
Louis A Sass, The Paradoxes of Delusion: Wittgenstein, Schreber, and the 
Schizophrenic Mind  (994), ix; Zvi Lothane, In Defense of Schreber: Soul Murder and 
Psychiatry (1992), 9.  
10
 See Angela Woods, Psychiatric Times (blog), “Conference Report: ‘Daniel Paul 
Schreber Centenary--200 Years of Sonnenstein,’” May 16, 2011, http://www. 
psychiatrictimes.com/blog/psych-history/content/article/10168/1862380.  
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postmortem areas in the cerebral cortex responsible for various psychotic symptoms.
11
 While 
today the focus has shifted from the cadaveric cranium to the blood flow and electrical 
signals of the living brain, then, as now, the belief that psychosis was caused by a “disabling 
and baffling brain disease” had all but extinguished interest in the experiences of people. 
Against this backdrop, then, as now, psychoanalysis is radical.
12
 
*** 
This paper reaches beyond the field of Schreber studies to a wider territory: the 
history and theory of schizophrenia.
13
 Although “en route” to Freud and Schreber, this is a 
destination at which we will not arrive. Instead, by focusing on what came before 
“Psychoanalytic Notes” began the memorializing of Schreber, I want to explore the idea that 
Schreber studies unfolds through a double forgetting.
 
In continuing to approach Freud’s 
“Psychoanalytic Notes” as though it were “the first time anyone had ever penetrated so 
deeply into the mental life of a psychotic,” scholars of Schreber risk overlooking an 
important chapter in the history of psychoanalysis, and indeed the history of schizophrenia. 
Perhaps more worryingly, they risk failing to recognize the textualspecificity of Schreber’s 
                                                          
11
Edward Shorter, A History of Psychiatry: From the Era of the Asylum to the Age of 
Prozac  (1997) 79-80.  
12
Andreas Meyer-Lindenberg, “From Maps to Mechanisms Through Neuroimaging of 
Schizophrenia,” Nature 468, no. 7321 (2010): 194.  
13
A version of this article was presented at the Daniel Paul Schreber Centenary 
conference in Pirna, April 13-15, 2001, and it draws on my book, The Sublime Object of 
Psychiatry: Schizophrenia in Clinical and Cultural Theory, published by Oxford University 
Press (2011), 67-76. I am grateful to Oxford University Press for permission to republish here 
extracts from a section of chapter two, “Tackling dementia praecox: Jung and Abraham,” 67-
76. . .  
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Memoirs, namely, its status as memoir, not as mind.
14
 A second potential danger is concealed 
in the claim that Schreber’s is “the paradigm case of madness in our time.”15 What does it 
mean to view one man’s suffering–or divine revelations–as paradigmatic of something as 
complex as psychosis, or modernity? Vincent Crapanzano observes that “from a literary-
discursive point of view [Memoirs] is one of the most challenging texts of the century,” but 
what or who might be silenced, or forgotten, as we take up Schreber’s challenge?16 
Schreber’s Memoirs enchants us through the seduction of wholeness. As Louis Sass 
notes: “the more closely one reads, the more difficult it becomes to dismiss the hope for 
achieving some kind of interpretive or empathetic understanding of Schreber’s experiences. 
The whole structure of his lived world seems to have such specificity and precision; one 
cannot help but wonder whether it is possible to discover a coherent system lying behind it 
all.”17 Hence, my opening insistence upon the fragment. What if instead of the coherent 
system–an achievement in part of the technology of autobiography–we attend to the 
“stammered, imperfect words without fixed syntax”?18 For that we need to return to an earlier 
and much less celebrated pas de deux between psychoanalyst and psychotic patient, and to 
begin, for the last time, with the “discovery” of a new form of psychosis.  
                                                          
14
Reuben Fine, A History of Psychoanalysis (1979), 54.  
15
Sass, The Paradoxes of Delusion, ix.   
16Vincent Crapanzano, “‘Lacking now is only the leading idea, that is--we, the rays, 
have no thoughts’: Interlocutory Collapse in Daniel Paul Schreber’s Memoirs of My Nervous 
Illness,” Critical Inquiry 24, no. 3 (1998): 739.  
17
Louis A. Sass, Madness and Modernism: Insanity in the Light of Modern Art, 
Literature and Thought  (1992), 244.  
18
Michel Foucault, Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of 
Reason, trans. Richard Howard (1993), xii–xiii.  
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*** 
Emil Kraepelin was a contemporary of Freud and one-time colleague of Paul Flechsig 
(the psychiatrist Schreber accused of “soul murder”). In his 1896 textbook, Clinical 
Psychiatry, Kraepelin offered the first definitive account of a new disease he called dementia 
praecox, an account based on years of longitudinal study of asylum populations.
 19
 In a 
radical reorganization of the field of psychosis, hebephrenia, paranoia, and catatonia were all 
distinguished from manic-depressive psychosis as types of a single underlying disease. 
Conceding that “the disease process in dementia praecox is not known,” Kraepelin 
nevertheless believed dementia praecox was caused by “a definite disease process in the 
brain,” perhaps triggered by an “autointoxication…related to processes in the sexual organs,” 
and that a large percentage of patients were made vulnerable to the disease by their “defective 
heredity.”20 Despite meeting “lively resistance” from his peers, Kraepelin’s account of this 
major form of psychosis (which was soon renamed schizophrenia by Eugen Blueler) survived 
without radical alteration for over one hundred years.
21
  
For Kraepelin it was the appearance and endurance of symptoms, and not the 
symbolic content, which mattered for the purposes of diagnosis. Meaning, at that time, was 
almost exclusively the prerogative of an emerging psychoanalysis. Freud, as is well known, 
did not treat psychotic patients, or at least not willingly. As a private practitioner for Vienna’s 
middle classes, he had no direct access to asylum populations, nor did he particularly desire 
                                                          
19
Emil Kraepelin, Clinical Psychiatry, trans. A. R. Diefendorf (1981).  
20
Ibid., 221-22.  
21
Kraepelin quoted in P. J. McKenna, Schizophrenia and Related Syndromes (1994), 
v; see also Eugen Bleuler, Dementia Praecox or, The Group of Schizophrenias, trans. Joseph 
Zinkin (1950).  
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it.
22
 With hysteria and not psychosis as the privileged psychic disorder of psychoanalysis, it is 
therefore unsurprising that Freud, at the outset, evinced little theoretical interest in the three 
forms of dementia praecox identified by Kraepelin. All but ignoring hebephrenia and 
catatonia, Freud did ponder the subject of paranoia in his letters to Fliess from 1895-1899, 
but at that time viewed it alongside hysteria and obsessional neurosis as a “sexual 
psychoneurosis.”23 Exploring connections between paranoia, autoeroticism, and sexual 
trauma, he defined paranoia in an 1896 paper as the “neurosis of defense par excellence” a 
statement that unequivocally demonstrates key nosological differences between 
psychoanalysis and the biological psychiatry of the day.
24
 These early speculations on the 
psychosexual origins of paranoia formed the foundation of Freud’s 1911 analysis of 
Schreber’s memoirs; however, it is Carl Jung and Karl Abraham, as practicing psychiatrists, 
who are credited with the first major psychoanalytic incursions into the territory of dementia 
praecox.
25
 
By the early twentieth century, Eugen Bleuler’s Burghölzli clinic was one of the 
Meccas of world psychiatry. Bleuler took a “lively interest” in Freud’s work, and Freud in 
                                                          
22
Shorter, A History of Psychiatry, 100. See also Judith Dupont, “Ferenczi’s 
“Madness,” Contemporary Psychoanalysis 24 (1988): 251; Deleuze and Guattari, Anti-
Oedipus, 23; Félix Guattari and Arno Munster, “Psycho-Analysis and Schizo-Analysis: An 
Interview With Félix Guattari,” Semiotext(e) II, no. 3 (1977): 79.  
23
Freud to William Fliess, 6 December 1896, in The Complete Letters of Sigmund 
Freud to Wilhelm Fliess 1887-1904, ed. Jeffrey Moussaieff Masson (1985), 209.  
24
Freud to Fliess, 30 May 1896, in The Complete Letters of Freud to Fliess, 188.  
25
Jung, The Psychology of Dementia Praecox; Karl Abraham, “The Psycho-Sexual 
Differences between Hysteria and Dementia Praecox,” in The Selected Papers of Karl 
Abraham (1948), 64-79.  
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turn courted the Swiss psychiatrists as they were in a unique position to test and legitimize 
psychoanalytic theory and practice through their work with asylum patients.
26
 In sharp 
contrast to Karl Jaspers’s later account of the unbreachable gulf of understanding between 
clinician and schizophrenic patient, Jung’s and Abraham’s analyses, in their reliance on 
Freud’s insights into the treatment of hysteric patients, pursued a strategy of equivalence 
rather than radical difference.
27
 If structural and symptomatological similarities between 
dementia praecox and neurosis could be demonstrated, not only could psychosis be brought 
into the psychoanalytic fold, but the tenets of psychoanalysis would win scientific legitimacy. 
Most striking about their work, however, is its complete departure from the modes of inquiry 
dominating biological psychiatry. Shunning the microscope, Kraepelin’s longitudinal 
approach, and any concrete search for the somatic origins of dementia praecox, Jung and 
Abraham, with Bleuler’s encouragement, focused their attentions on the substance of 
symptoms. The most contentious issue between Jung and Abraham, and in turn Freud, was 
the role that infantile sexuality and the libido would play in their appearance.  
The publication in 1906 of Jung’s The Psychology of Dementia Praecox followed 
Freud’s The Interpretation of Dreams (of which Jung was an avid reader) and Three Essays 
on the Theory of Sexuality, but it preceded personal contact between the two men. Jung 
begins his study by hailing Bleuler as his respected superior and clarifying his position 
regarding the as yet relatively unknown science of psychoanalysis. His preface is worth 
                                                          
26
See Sigmund Freud, “An Autobiographical Study” (1925), in The Freud Reader, ed. 
Peter Gay (1995), 32; Klaus Theweleit, Object-choice (All you need is love. . . ): On mating 
strategies & a fragment of a Freud biography, trans. Malcolm Green (1990), 60.  
27
Karl Jaspers, General Psychopathology, 7th ed., trans. J. Hoenig and Marian W. 
Hamilton (1972), 447; see also Jung, The Psychology of Dementia Praecox, 16-17.  
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quoting at length as it gives an indication of the status of psychoanalysis at the time and 
anticipates the major issues of contention between Jung and Freud: 
Even a superficial glance at my work will show how indebted I am to the 
ingenious conceptions of Freud [who]. . . has not yet attained fair recognition and 
appreciation. . . I can assure you that in the beginning I naturally entertained all the 
objections which are advanced in the literature against Freud. But, I said to myself 
Freud could only be refuted by one who himself had made much use of the 
psychoanalytic method . . .  Fairness to Freud does not, however, signify, as many 
may fear, a conditionless surrender to dogma; indeed, independent judgment can very 
well be maintained beside it. If I, for instance, recognize the complex mechanisms of 
dreams and hysteria, it by no means signifies that I ascribe to the infantile sexual 
trauma the exclusive importance seemingly attributed to it by Freud. Still less does it 
mean that I place sexuality so preponderantly in the foreground, or that I even 
ascribe to it the psychological universality which Freud apparently postulates under 
the impression of the very powerful rôle which sexuality plays in the psyche . . . 
Nevertheless, all these are quite incidental and completely vanish beside the 
psychological principles, the discovery of which is Freud’s greatest merit.28  
Jung’s text struggles between guarded qualifications and praise of Freud as an 
“ingenious” if “as yet hardly recognized investigator.”29 The book begins from Freud’s 
hypothesis that paranoia arises “from the repression of painful memories, and that the form of 
the symptoms is determined by the content of the repression.”30 However, if the psychic 
mechanisms of hysteria can be discerned in the paranoid form of dementia praecox, what 
                                                          
28
The Psychology of Dementia Praecox, iii-iv.  
29
Ibid., 29, 21.  
30
Freud (1896) quoted in ibid. , 26.  
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accounts for the greater rigidity of psychotic symptoms, and, moreover, what explains the 
appearance of one disorder rather than another? Pronouncing Freud’s analysis insufficiently 
complex, Jung argues that “we must therefore postulate that in the case of dementia praecox 
there is a specific resultant of the affects (toxine?), which causes the definite fixation of the 
complex by injuring the sum total of the psychic functions.”31 The conceptual apparatus from 
which Jung develops his own account of dementia praecox is loosely psychoanalytic and yet 
decidedly opposed to Freud’s analysis of paranoid symptom formation: with the etiological 
role of childhood sexuality explicitly rejected, and an unknown somatic origin repeatedly 
postulated, Jung integrates the received wisdom of fin-de-siècle psychiatry with Freudian 
concepts and methodologies and the Burghölzli’s own brand of psychology.32  
Chief among the experimental techniques favored by Bleuler and Jung was the word-
association test, which resembles what we now think of as free association.
33
 According to 
Jung, the psyche is composed of many interconnected “feeling-toned complexes,” each of 
which has a sensory, affective, and intellectual component.
34
 The word-association test 
revealed to him that “every association belongs … to some complex,” that is, every word 
                                                          
31
The Psychology of Dementia Praecox, 32.   
32
Jung’s rejection of the primary role of the sexual libido in the etiology of dementia 
praecox went on to become a central issue in his split from Freud, see Robert S. Steele, Freud 
and Jung: Conflicts of Interpretation (1982).  
33
It was from Kraepelin’s clinic in Munich that Bleuler and Jung first learned of this 
psychological experiment, and in turn demonstrated its capacity to provide empirical 
evidence for the presence of unconscious patterns of association. John Kerr, A Most 
Dangerous Method: The Story of Jung, Freud, and Sabina Spielrein (1993), 44-45.  
34
Jung, The Psychology of Dementia Praecox, 32.  
12 
 
triggers already existing complexes within the psyche.
35
 In order to theorize the aberrant 
functioning of complexes in dementia praecox as indicated by the word-association test, Jung 
investigated parallels between dementia praecox, dreams, and hysteria. Dreams, on his Freud-
inspired model, appear as “symbolic expressions of repressed complexes” which “contain the 
characteristic features of mythological thinking” and are identical to those of dementia 
praecox: “Let the dreamer walk about and act like one awakened and we have the clinical 
picture of dementia praecox.”36 Hysteria, like dementia praecox, is for Jung the result of a 
particularly pernicious (but not necessarily sexual) complex expressed in all areas of psychic 
activity, and in drawing elaborate parallels between the disorders on the levels of 
“characterlogical abnormality,” stereotypy, emotional, and intellectual disturbance, Jung 
consistently implies that differences between them are a matter of degree. Compelled, 
however, to account for the distinctive splitting, disintegration, and dissociation of psychic 
functions in dementia praecox, Jung hypothesized that a pathogenic complex produces “an 
anomalous metabolism (toxine?), which injures the brain” and prevents the acquisition or 
development of new complexes.
37
 “At best,” the patient “escapes with a psychic mutilation,” 
but as they stand “under the ban of an invincible complex” the “separation of the 
schizophrenic from reality [and] the loss of interest in objective happenings” cannot really be 
remedied.
38
 By attributing a single affective cluster of sensations and memories such 
devastating agency within the psyche, Jung was effectively saying “that certain thoughts, or 
at least certain feelings, were metabolically dangerous.”39  
                                                          
35
Ibid., 35.  
36
Ibid., 51, 56, 79.  
37
Ibid., 31-32.  
38
Ibid., 32.  
39
Kerr, A Most Dangerous Method, 180.  
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Following the publication of The Psychology of Dementia Praecox, Jung presented 
his toxin theory of dementia praecox at the First International Congress for Psychoanalysis, 
held in Salzburg in 1908. It was a prestigious and political occasion, and, thanks to the 
participation of the Burghölzli psychiatrists, it marked a turning point in the psychoanalytic 
understanding of dementia praecox. Jung brought psychosis into the psychoanalytic fold 
methodologically by demonstrating that “meaning” could be discerned behind the “madness” 
of individual patients, but he refused to concede that a sexual complex was the decisive factor 
in all cases. By contrast, Karl Abraham’s paper “The Psycho-Sexual Differences Between 
Hysteria and Dementia Praecox,” in theoretically differentiating dementia praecox from 
hysteria, was praised for forging the crucial (because psychosexual and therefore “properly” 
psychoanalytic) connection between the two.  
Although its origins lay in Freud’s unpublished thinking on paranoia, Abraham’s 
presentation served the strategic function of linking a theory of autoeroticism with clinical 
observations of dementia praecox patients from the highly respected Swiss clinic.
40
 
Abraham’s paper was proof that psychoanalysis had something to say about the psychic 
origins of dementia praecox. By contrast, Jung’s toxin theory proved decidedly unpopular in 
psychoanalytic circles at the time, and, although he was still championing it as late as 1958, it 
has consistently failed to win much support.
 41
  
                                                          
40
In later publications, Freud is careful to reference Abraham’s paper in such a way 
that it is clear he assumes ultimate responsibility for its accuracy. See Freud, “Psycho-
Analytic Notes” 41; see also “Lecture XXVI: The Libido Theory and Narcissism," in The 
Standard Edition (1963), 16:415.  
41Andrew Samuels, “Jung and the post-Jungians,” in The Cambridge Companion to 
Jung, ed. Polly Young-Eisendrath and Terence Dawson (1997), 6.  
14 
 
However, The Psychology of Dementia Praecox is most significant not for the validity 
or influence of Jung’s toxin theory of dementia praecox, but for the extremely detailed 
analysis of one of his patients, Babette S. This case study highlights Jung’s principal 
contribution to the psychoanalytic investigation of dementia praecox, namely that “Unlike the 
majority of psychiatrists before or since, he gave serious attention to what his schizophrenic 
patients actually said and did, and was able to demonstrate that their delusions, 
hallucinations, and gestures were not simply ‘mad’ but full of psychological meaning.”42 
While Jung did not supply the kind of comprehensive, linear narrative Freud would 
produce from Schreber’s Memoirs, he analytically untangled Babette’s frequently bizarre 
word-associations and succeeded in interpreting seemingly disconnected, disparate, 
impenetrable signifiers as elements of particular complexes. It is this impulse--this process-- 
that most distinguishes the psychoanalytic approach to schizophrenia from its psychiatric 
counterpart.  
Babette S., an impoverished seamstress, had been institutionalized for over fifteen 
years before commencing analysis with Jung. She suffered from paranoid delusions of 
physical mutilation and grandeur, severe hallucinations and affectless, disconnected speech, 
but sought to explain herself as clearly as possible to Jung in the vain hope that he might 
secure her release from the Burghölzli. The case study includes list after list of Babette’s 
word-associations. Drawing attention to her “extraordinarily long reaction times,” her 
neologisms, and her bizarre and sometimes embellished responses, Jung concluded that his 
patient was psychically dominated by numerous complexes, so much so that “she speaks, 
acts, and dreams of nothing else but what the complex inspires.
43
 Each neologism or 
stereotype connected to one of three interrelated complexes–wish-fulfillment (delusions of 
                                                          
42
Anthony Stevens, Jung (1994), 12.  
43
Jung, The Psychology of Dementia Praecox, 101.  
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grandeur), ideas of injury (delusions of persecution) or an erotic complex. As part of his 
experiment, Jung repeated Babette’s neologisms (what she calls her “power-words”) to her as 
stimulus words. Her response to the grandiose stereotype, “I am the finest professorship,” is 
quoted above.  
Where Jung proves masterful in his analysis of her “word salad” (a term he coined) is 
through a rigorous, meticulous reading of seemingly impenetrable neologisms as 
symptomatic of specific complexes. Reluctant to speculate on why these complexes 
developed, he aims to show “how the patient, brought up under sad domestic conditions, 
amid distress and hard labor, creates in her psychosis an enormously complicated, and 
seemingly altogether confused fantastic structure.”44 
It is difficult when reading Babette’s responses not to be struck by the literary quality 
of her fantastic structure. Jung treats them as a code to be deciphered or a poem to be 
interpreted, and also remarks frequently on their resemblance to dreams:  
Like a poet impelled by his inner impulses, the patient pictures to us in the 
symptoms the hopes and disappointments of her life. … [She] speaks as if in dreams–I 
know of no better expression….This uneducated and scantily endowed patient thinks 
without any directing idea, in obscure dreamlike pictures and amid indistinct 
expressions. All this contributes to make her stream of thought as incomprehensible as 
possible. … [Unlike the dreams of normal people, here] we have long and extensively 
elaborated fancies, which on the one hand are comparable to a great poem and on the 
other to the romances and fantastic pictures of somnambulists.
45
  
 Although the comparison is seductive, Avital Ronnell challenges the move to equate 
dreams with dementia praecox, arguing that “while the dream was thought to have latent 
                                                          
44
Ibid., 135.  
45
Ibid., 135-36.  
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content, a retrievable unconscious narrativity, the schizophrenic utterance remains a pistol 
shot in the dark of metaphysics, shattered, fragmented.”46 By “making sense” of a number of 
Babette’s more opaque phrases, what Jung ultimately delivers is only a series of discrete 
interpretations of elements of his patient’s disturbed psyche rather than a narrative that would 
draw these together. Fragmentary understanding, then, comes to displace and replace any 
discussion of cure or the alleviation of symptoms and operates independently of a theory of 
etiology, toxin-related or otherwise.  
Through his analysis of Babette, Jung sought to establish the paranoid form of 
dementia praecox as the disorder most amenable to psychoanalytic investigation, 
demonstrating, albeit tenuously, how the idiosyncratic content of a patient’s symptoms 
followed previously identified narrative patterns (delusions of grandeur and persecution). For 
Jung, the domain of dementia praecox was “too extensive and yet too obscure” for his work 
on paranoia to be conclusive; promising to extend his inquiry into catatonic and hebephrenic 
schizophrenia at a future date, his final statement is at once apologetic, defensive, and self-
aggrandizing: “somebody finally had to take it upon himself to set the stone rolling.”47 And 
roll it did–inexorably on towards Freud’s analysis of a text introduced to him by Jung, 
Memoirs of My Nervous Illness.  
Although many critics would prefer not to call attention to the influence of Jung’s 
case study on “Psycho-Analytic Notes,” its importance should not be underestimated. What 
Jung presented was an analysis of an acutely psychotic patient–an analysis based upon 
psychological experiments in real time, conducted in an asylum, and involving a range of 
non-verbal and emotional communications that could not be captured adequately on the page. 
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Babette did not provide him with a cogent or compelling narrative of her illness but with 
disconnected speech and “difficult” behavior. It is unsurprising, then, that Jung’s text deals in 
fragments and cannot deliver a complete psychological picture of his patient, especially as he 
suggests that the disorder has a metabolic–not psychological–origin. Despite uncanny 
similarities between the delusional schema of Babette and Schreber, the case history of this 
poor and uneducated woman could not match the analytic possibilities presented by the 
autobiography of an esteemed male jurist.
48
 Freud even attempted to disclaim any similarity 
between Babette and Schreber: her “dementia praecox” was apparently “far severer than this 
one” and “exhibited symptoms far more remote from the normal.”49 Equally, when it came to 
the weaving of linear narratives, Jung’s theory of co-existent complexes was no match for the 
capacity of libido theory to trace all symptoms and psychic dysfunctions back to a primary 
psychosexual disturbance. What Jung did establish was the possibility of “penetrating” the 
supposedly “impenetrable” symptoms of dementia praecox by subjecting them to 
psychoanalytic investigation. This, together with Abraham’s authoritative account of the 
psychosexual origins of dementia praecox, constitutes a foundation for Freud’s work on 
paranoia.  
In this context, Karl Jaspers’s analysis of the then-contemporary work of Freud and 
the Zurich school on dementia praecox is particularly salient. While Jaspers acknowledged 
that the psychoanalytic scrutiny of the “delusional contents of dementia praecox” can be seen 
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as an improvement on psychiatry’s efforts to classify the chaos of schizophrenia, he remained 
justifiably suspicious of psychoanalytic methodology:  
“They have thus come to ‘understand’ almost all the contents of these psychoses by 
applying a procedure which as the results show only leads on into endlessness. In the most 
literary sense they have rediscovered the ‘meaning of madness’ or at least they believe they 
have. …The whole interpretation is a translation to schizophrenia of concepts which have 
been arrived at during the analysis of hysteria. We should, however, never forget the radical 
differences which exist between hysteria and a schizophrenic process.”50 
Jaspers’s observations from 1913 inform the argument, more fully developed elsewhere, that 
psychoanalysis approaches schizophrenia as a textual puzzle which reveals the collapse of 
psychic functioning if only it is properly deciphered.
51
 Jung’s The Psychology of Dementia 
Praecox deserves recognition, I suggest, as the founding text in this tradition. As he showed, 
the analyst’s interpretive mastery over dementia praecox, secured through a potentially 
inexhaustible process, does not deliver the analysands from their schizophrenic symptoms as 
it might with neurosis. It is simply an end in itself, and, if Jaspers is correct, one that actually 
obfuscates the fundamental inaccessibility and un-understandability of schizophrenia.
52
 Jung 
could only point to how Babette’s speech revealed her complexes; the question of why she 
                                                          
50
Jaspers, General Psychopathology, 539, 410. Jacques Lacan, too, praises Freud for 
his interpretive skill. See The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: Book III The Psychoses 1955-1956, 
ed. Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. Russell Grigg (1993), 10-11.  
51
See chap. 2, “Schizophrenia: The Sublime Text of Psychoanalysis,” in Woods, The 
Sublime Object of Psychiatry.  
52
Jaspers, General Psychopathology, 447. See also J. Hoenig, “Schizophrenia-Clinical 
Section,” in A History of Clinical Psychiatry: The Origin and History of Psychiatric 
Disorders, ed. German E.  Berrios and Roy Porter (1995), 345.  
19 
 
became psychotic, when others who experience “distress and hardship” among “sad domestic 
conditions” do not, is unanswered, and it is clear that his analysis did little to mitigate her 
distress. While treating schizophrenia as a disorder of signification allows the analyst to 
restore or attribute meaning to schizophrenic speech, the analyst’s narrative fails to address 
the structure of schizophrenic experience, or to explain why schizophrenia arises and cannot 
be “cured.” The clinical picture of schizophrenia is recast as a text in which the “meaning of 
madness” is rediscovered, but what, then, of the person in question?  
*** 
“I suffer in an unknown manner that is hieroglyphical.” Babette is as eloquent in 
expressing her distress as Jung is definitive in his analysis: “This explanation is quite 
sensible. Hieroglyphics for the uneducated is the proverbial example for the 
incomprehensible. Patient does not understand why and to what end she suffers. It is a 
hieroglyphical suffering.”53 
The trope of dementia praecox or schizophrenia as hieroglyph is an enduring one. 
“[Freud] deciphers [Memoirs] in the way hieroglyphics are deciphered,” Lacan observed. R. 
D. Laing, too, felt that “The difficulties facing us here [in the analysis of schizophrenia] are 
somewhat analogous to the difficulties facing the expositor of hieroglyphics, an analogy 
Freud was fond of drawing; they are, if anything, greater.”54 The metaphor works to reinforce 
the idea that madness is a disruption of the symbolic order, the language of reason; that it 
belongs to a world that is remote in space, time and cultural sensibility; but also, crucially, 
that with sufficient effort and interpretive skill the apparently un-understandable can be 
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comprehended, the fragment rendered whole.
55
  Each of the commentators on Schreber’s 
Memoirs stages, to a greater or lesser degree, this recuperative act of decoding; a turn of the 
interpretive master key intended to spring open the secrets of one of the twentieth century’s 
most “challenging” texts. But are there some texts for which the interpretive challenge 
appears too great, as in the case of the untamed autobiographical embroidery? 
Museum curators have spent hours with magnifying glasses poring over every bit of 
the garment. Sections of the text have been photographed, copied, retraced and enlarged. Like 
a coded document or a hieroglyph before the discovery of the Rosetta Stone, Agnes Richter’s 
jack remains a tantalizing clue to an unknown world. “Ich” is the word easiest to discern, but 
whatever Agnes confided to that “I,” that self, remains a mystery to everyone else.56 
Babette Straub and Agnes Richter, seamstresses in turn of the century asylums, do not 
live on through a legacy that is legible. Their artifacts were not typed, bound and published; 
they were not explicitly addressed in sparkling prose to men of law, psychiatry, and theology; 
they evinced a powerful narrativity but eschewed or escaped autobiography’s temporal, 
discursive conventions. Recasting Schreber’s “exemplary” experience as simply 
“exceptional,” the glimpses we have into the lives of Agnes and Babette remind us the 
fragment; silence, the seemingly illegible and undecipherable, can also testify to strength and 
suffering in madness.  
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